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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines current U.S. policy vis-a-vis Cuba. and its impact
on the development of democracy in Cuba. It argues that U.S. policy is
counterproductive in promoting a sustainable inclusive democracy in Cuba,
because it demands that the Castro regime hold "free and fair" elections prior
to any normalization in the relations between the two countries. This demand
ignores the fact that Cuban Civil society is woefully underdeveloped, and is not
prepared to effectively participate in the creation and maintenance of a truly
representational government. Without a vibrant civil society, Cuba is likely to
fail under the control of an authoritarian, populist regime whose relationship
to the United States may prove no more cordial than Castro's.
The thesis recommends practical steps through which the United States
can reward Cuban liberalization without requiring immediate political
democratization. The goal of these steps is to encourage the opening of
political space within which Cuban associational groups with a clear stake in a
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The policy of the United States vis-a-vis Cuba has, for the past thirty
years, been focused primarily o.n bringing about the fall of Fidel Castro
rather than on aiding in the development of a sustainable democracy. Far
from threatening the Castro regime. the United States has provided Castro
with a propaganda coup. The continued enmity of the world's last
superpower has enflamed Cuban nationalism at a time when Cuban
socialism has proven unworkable, prolonging the life of the regime in
defense of the Nation.
U.S. policy demands that Cuba hold "free and fair" elections prior to
any normalization in the relationship between the two countries. This
demand for conformity to a procedural definition of democracy ignores the
fact that Cuban civil society is woefully underdeveloped, and is not
prepared to effectively participate in the creation and maintainance of a
truly representational government. Without a vibrant civil society, Cuba
is likely to fall under the control of an authoritarian, populist government
whose relationship to the United States may prove no more cordial than
Castro's.
Chapter II of the thesis reviews the literature on regime transition
and democratization, and finds that a civil society capable of controlling its
vii
own government can only be created gradually through a process of
liberalization. Rather than designing a policy that rewards the incremental
steps of liberalization, the United States insists that the Cuban regime
leapfrog over the necessary process of consensus building, political
development and the establishment of trust, and hold the elections that
might well eliminate it. Though the ouster of Fidel Castro may be the final
step in bringing democracy to Cuba, it should not be viewed as the ultimate
goal.
Chapters III and IV examine the current state of Cuban civil society.
Chapter III examines the success of mass organizations in promoting
collective behavior, and its effect on the development of organized
opposition movements.
Chapter IV examines the regime's repression of an effective opposition
through a combination of "carrots and sticks" tactics.
Chapter V looks at attitudes within civil society that militate against
the development of organized opposition, including a belief in the regime's
moral and historical legitimacy, the linkage of Cuban nationalism with the
socialist revolution, and the fear that the chaos in Eastern Europe will be
recreated in Cuba.
Chapter VI examines Cuba's small, clandestine opposition movement,
composed primarily of human rights groups which advocate greater
viii
personal freedom rather than the overthrow of the Castro regime. The
thesis argues that U.S. policy has hurt these nascent groups more than it
has helped, providing the regime with justification for cracking down on
activists in the name of national security. The migration and voluntary
exile of intellectual and technical elite has also removed from the scene
those people who might otherwise have provided the backbone of an
opposition movement.
Chapter VII looks at the escalation of U.S. hostility towards Cuba
through the implementation of the Cuban Democracy Act. This legislation
attempts to tighten the embargo through an extra-territorial application of
U.S. jurisdiction, regarded by many U.S. allies and trading partners as a
violation of a general principle of international law and the sovereignty of
independent nations. The chapter then offers the policy of "comprehensive
engagement", now being applied in China, as a more forward-looking
example of U.S. involvement in the rehabilitation of non-democratic
regimes.
Chapter VIII forecasts the events that might occur if Fidel Castro falls
before Cuban civil society has had the opportunity to develop sufficient
political space. The most likely scenerio involves political instability and
a violent struggle for power, an uncontrollable flood of refugees to the
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United States, and pressure for U.S. intervention that will further
exacerbate the chaotic situation.
The thesis concludes by arguing that U.S. policy should concentrate
on promoting democracy from the bottom up rather than imposing it from
the top down, aiding in the establishment of associational groups with a
clear stake in a freer society. The thesis recommends that in order to assist
in the growth of civil society, the United States should gradually end its
embargo on Cuba and position itself economically and culturally for
maximum influence on the development of a democratic, free-market
ideology. To achieve this the United States should work with the Castro
regime, providing rewards for liberalization without requiring immediate
political democratization. Castro's strength thus far has been the ability to
paint whatever picture of the United States he chooses. Exposure to
American culture, products. business opportunities and citizens would
expose Cubans to new ideas and expectations, and would provide the
impetus for the development of a civil society too complex to be controlled
by a totalitarian regime.
x
I. INTRODUCTION
For over thirty years the United States has subjected the state of Cuba
to an economic and cultural embargo that has varied in intensity according
to the level of hostility experienced between the United States and the
Soviet Union, Cuba's patron state. With the fall of the Soviet Union.
communism as a worldwide ideological force ceased to pose any significant
threat to the national secrity of the United States. With the political
conversion of its former patron and the subsequent loss of military and
financial support, Cuba entered an economic freefall and suffered a
significant diminution of its ability to cause the U.S. more than symIjolic
grief. Yet the United States has chosen to tighten its embargo of Cuba and
press the international community to follow suit, even though the island
can no longer be considered a Soviet staging area, Cuban troops are out of
Africa, and the surrogate wars in Latin America are over.
In 1992, the United States Congress passed the Cuban Democracy
Act. which prohibits foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies from trading
with Cuba, bans ships that have delivered or will deliver goods to Cuba
from using U.S. ports for six months, and authorizes the president to deny
U.S. aid and special trade benefits to nations that give Cuba financial
assistance or trade at subsidized rates.
Important U.S. allies regard the Act as an extra-territorial application
of U.S. jurisdiction and a violation of a general principle of international law
and the sovereignty of independent nations.' In response to the bill's
passage, the members of the United Nations General Assembly voted
overwhelmingly to pass a resolution calling for an end to Washington's 30-
year embargo. With the exception of Israel and Romania no country came
to the United States' support, making it clear that the rationale of the Cold
War had ended and that allies would no longer fall into line behind a policy
that had no effect on their security but actively challenged sovereignty and
profit. With the ebb of ideology as a driving force in the world, many
'Given that foreign subsidiaries are governed by the laws of the host
country, the Act raises the issues of extra territoriality and sovereignty:
certainly, the United States would not stand for such a requirement
imposed by another country. It would also seem to violate international
laws protecting the free movement of international trade and shipping,
violates a 1975 resolution of the Organization of American States which
lifted collective sanctions against Cuba and permitted bilateral trade
agreements, and runs counter to the principles of the international
commerce established by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
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nations made it clear that they would no longer sacrifice their domestic
interests on behalf of a U. S.-generated "crusade".
This thesis will examine current U.S. policy vis-a-vis Cuba. and ask
whether it supports the development of democracy or is simply focused on
bringing about the fall of Fidel Castro. It argues that U.S. policy is
counterproductive in promoting a sustainable, inclusive democracy.
U.S. policy currently demands that Cuba hold "free and fair" elections
prior to any normalization in the relationship between the two countries,
with the unspoken proviso that Fidel Castro not be in power after the votes
are counted. This demand for conformity to a procedural definition of
democracy ignores the fact that Cuban civil society is woefull--
underdeveloped, and is not prepared to effectively participate in the
creation and maintenance of a truly representational government. Without
a vibrant civil society, Cuba Is likely to fall under the control of an
authoritarian, populist regime whose relationship to the United States may
prove no more cordial than Castro's.
This thesis will review the literature on the development of civil society.
Including the work of Samuel Huntington. Thomas Carothers: Alfred
Stepan, Larry Diamond, Graham Allison, and Robert Dahl, all of whom
3
agree that a society capable of controlling its government can only be
created gradually through a process of liberalization. It will then review
the state of civil society within Cuba. and ask whether it is capable of
promoting such a course of liberalization under the constraints placed
upon it by the regime as a result of the perception of U.S. threat.
The thesis will look at the formation of U.S. policy towards Cuba.
particularly the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992. It will ask whether the
policy was developed to promote democracy or whether its intent was to
appease the ultra-conservative Cuban American National Foundation and
win votes and campaign contributions in support of domestic politics.
Having found the latter to be true, the thesis will then offer suggestions for
more positive U.S. involvement in the empowerment of Cuban civil society.
thereby strengthening the liberalization process.
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II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
For the United States to promote the development of democracy.
policymakers must recognize that "development" is the operative word. Too
often, the U.S. has replaced the prerequisites needed for a peaceful
evolution with those likely to result in a chaotic, explosive "revolution" into
an unknown future. In the case of Cuba, U.S. policy is directed toward the
main goal of seeing Fidel Castro removed from power. Rather than
designing a policy that rewards the incremental steps of liberalization, the
United States insists that the Cuban regime leapfrog over the necessary
process of consensus building, political development and the establishment
of trust, and hold the elections that might well eliminate it. Though the
ouster of Fidel Castro may be the final step in bringing democracy to Cuba,
it should not be viewed as the ultimate goal.
A. THOMAS CAROTHERS
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In his book, In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy Toward Latin
America in the Reagan Years,2 Thomas Carothers charges that U.S. policy
is too simplistic, concentrating on the form of government more than on the
substance of the governance. To the United States, he says. democracy is
like an off-on switch in which the holding of elections and the coming to
power of an elected government is the crucial transition from off to on.
Historically, and as part of cultural mythology, U.S. democracy was born
full grown from revolution: there was no slow process of transformation
from a feudal or authoritarian past. and the Constitution and its
institutional arrangement of government has existed without major change
since its creation. With no sense of the requirements for long-term
concessional evolution, policymakers are inclined to think that all a society
needs to achieve democracy is the installation of the correct institutional
framework.
In many ways, the United States promotes democracy much as it
wL Md negotiate a hostage situation. Rather than spreading the ideas.
principles, and desire for democracy from the bottom up, it demands that
21n the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America in the
Reagan Years. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
1991.
6
the "top" release its citizens at once or suffer the consequences. Dazed and
suffering from a country-wide version of the Stockholm syndrome, the
released populace often has no idea how to maintain its freedom, and
resents the United States for having propelled them out of lives they
understood into a system that does not automatically deliver security.
wealth, or comfort.
Carothers criticizes the United States' definition of democracy as being
too narrow, its focus on an electoral definition out of synch with the day-to-
day reality experienced by citizens of non-democratic regimes. To them, the
concept of "democracy" goes beyond political participation to include
aspects of economic and social justice that the U.S. may be unwilling to
support.
Before a society can produce a viable democratic foundation it must
first address the social and economic conditions that militate against the
responsible exercise of political freedom. Although the situation varies from
country to country, these conditions often include the concentration of land
and resources in the hands of a small elite and the monopolization of
political power for the purpose of maintaining control of land and
resources.
7
In the American perspective, democracy is a product of its economic
system -a capitalistic, free-market, free-wheeling affair in which all have the
guarantee of a chance but no guarantee of success. The expectation of the
common citizen in a non-democratic society, however, is that the
implementation of a democratic form of government will make them the
equal of any Elite, not only in the voting booth but in the distribution of
land and resources as well. Thus, the United States' emphasis on
formalism to the neglect of substantive social issues lays the groundwork
for the failure of democratic institutions when they prove unable to meet
the expectations of the masses.
In a review of U.S. efforts to promote democracy in Latin America,
Carothers draws six lessons for use by future policymakers:
1. The United States does not really have much influence over the
political evolution of most Latin American countries. The political
evolution of a country in any given period involves the most
fundamental elements of the country's social, economic, political, and
cultural character. The notion that an external actor can have a
profound and lasting effect on that political evolution through some
set of relatively short-term diplomatic, economic, or even military
means ignores the complex reality of how societies are made up and
how they change.
2. Leftist revolutionary movements are more a symptom than a cause
of a lack of democracy. In reality, the main obstacles to democracy
in Latin America have historically been a variety of structural
domestic factors such as the extreme concentration of economic and
8
political power in the hands of undemocratic elites, the sociopolitical
marginalization of whole classes of citizens, and the lack of any
underlying national consensus on basic democratic values.
3. The conception of democracy Americans tend to apply abroad is not
well-suited to generating effective policies for the promotion of
democracy. U.S. policies concentrate on shaping the institutions of
government in certain acceptable forms while underemphasizing the
importance of bottom-up self-transformation as the basis for
democratic development.
4. The nature of the U.S. foreign policymaking process is at odds with
the nature of the task of promoting democracy in other countries.
Policy initiatives should be both steadily funded and implemented
over many years rather than called into question year after year. and
they should be planned in advance rather than simply improvised in
response to a sudden crisis or turn of events. Policy should be
carried out in a low-profile manner, and there should be low
expectations as to what effect an external actor can have in shaping
the development of another country.
5. Simply agreeing on promoting democracy as the core element of U.S.
policy towards Latin America does not necessarily mean that there
will be agreement on policy directions.
6. In making democracy its primary policy focus in Latin America, the
United States distorts its own view of the region. The complexities of
social, economic, and political reality in Latin America may render




In Political Order in Changing Societies, Samuel Huntington makes
the case that elections are not the first answer to democracy but rather the
concluding act in regime legitimation and the development of political
organizations which expand to include all citizens. Far from serving as the
initial indicator of democratic transition, elections are often disruptive and
reactionary, hindering the development of an atmosphere of trust.
legitimacy and conciliation. For a society that has not yet developed this
necessary foundation, an election may sound the death-knell for future
democracy. Thus, political organizations and a legitimate public order
must be established before an election can take place with any chance of
avoiding chaotic dissension.
In The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century,4
Huntington notes that "People Power," the mass mobilization of outraged
citizens demanding a change in the regime, rarely plays a central role in
regime transitions. An external force seeking to effect democratic change
in another country cannot make it happen simply by goading the masses
'Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven and
London: Yale University Press. 1968.
"'The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.
Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press. 1991.
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into violent protest. In reviewing the transitions to democracy that have
taken place in the latter half of the twentieth century, Huntington
concludes that democracy can be made only through the methods of
democracy. Negotiations, compromises, and agreements between political
leaders in government and opposition are at the heart of democratization.
A central compromise in the negotiation process is "the democratic
bargain," the trade-off between participation and moderation. This
reinforces the central premise of democracy-that the winner does not take
all. Participation can be broadened and more groups allowed to compete
for power if the current regime does not feel that in so doing it destroys its
own agenda and its individual members.
Conditions to support democracy must be in place, but the emergence
of social, economic, and external conditions favorable to democracy is never
enough to produce democracy. Some political leaders who want it to
happen and who are willing to take liberalizing steps must be in a position
to initiate change. This means that moderate forces within the regime must
be in a position to promote liberalization without risking the automatic
accusation of "treating with the enemy".
11
C. LARRY DIAMOND
In Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism.: Strategies for
Democratization, 5 Larry Diamond emphasizes the role of gradualism and
sequencing in developing a stable, democratic system. Democracy is based
on an institutionalized competition for power. and this competition can only
become stable by developing a measure of mutual trust and confidence
among the various contenders for power, a respect for the rules of the
game.
The most successful path of democratic evolution involves initial
development of political competition within a relatively small circle of
opposing elites, gradually expanding to incorporate an increasing
proportion of the population as legitimate participants. This gradualism
gives contending actors time to learn to tolerate and work with one another-
and so to trust that defeat will not mean elimination.
There is also a need for the democratic opposition to play within the
initially very restricted games allowed them by the regime. This gives the
regime time to evolve into the new relationship, and allows it to more or less
"
5
'Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Strategies for
Democratization," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1989.
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determine the timing, pace, and structure of its own exit - an insistence by
democratic forces on immediate and humiliating abdication will likely abort
prospective transition.
This gradualism benefits the opposition by allowing them time to gain
experience with the risks and requirements of democratic elections and
democratic governance before the entire state structure is opened to
political competition. Democratic parties need time to develop their
identities, leaderships, principles, and organizations, free from the
pressures of an imminent election in which everything will be at stake.
The process of liberalization seems almost invariably to precede or
lead democratization. Since it does not directly and immediately
involve the transfer or surrender of power, the risks to established
interests of liberalization are significantly less than of democratization.
Liberalization is the process of making effective certain rights that
protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts
committed by the state or third parties. On the level of individuals,
these guarantees include the classical elements of the liberal tradition:
habeas corpus: sanctity of private home and correspondence: the right
to be defended in a fair trial according to preestablished laws: freedom
of movement, speech, and petition; and so forth. On the level of
groups, these rights cover such things as freedom from punishment
for expressions of collective dissent from government policy, freedom
from censorship of the means of communication, and freedom to
associate voluntarily with other citizens... There does not appear to be
any necessary or logical sequence to the emergence of these "spaces"
for liberalized action... Nor are progressions in these domains
irreversible. On the contrary, a characteristic of this early stage in the
transition is its precarious dependence upon governmental power,
which remains arbitrary and capricious. If, however, those liberalized
13
practices are not too immediately and obviously threatening to the
regime, they tend to accumulate, become institutionalized, and
thereby raise the effective and perceived costs of their eventual
annulment.'
Liberalization provides the citizenry with the legal space and means to
push the process of transition forward. The opening of certain avenues for
autonomy of the society -like some forms of collective bargaining, lower
level trade union elections, free elections in professional associations,
political activity in the universities, protest by neighborhood associations.
the support by the churches of certain forms of protest, a relatively
autonomous cultural life. etc., create opportunities for opposition leaders
and sometimes illegal parties to achieve a certain presence and basis of
support.
Society-led regime transitions, brought about by diffuse protests by
grass-roots organizations, massive but uncoordinated general strikes, and
by general withdrawal of support of the government, might occur before
QFrom Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions
about Uncertain Democracies. Edited by Guillermo O'Donnell and
Philippe Schmitter. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins
University Press. 1991
14
liberalization has created a foundation upon which a democratic
government could be built.
D. ALFRED STEPAN
In Paths toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative
Considerations.7 Alfred Stepan argues that the most likely outcome of
crises of authoritarian regimes stemming from diffuse pressures and forces
in society is either a newly constituted successor authoritarian government.
or a caretaker military junta promising elections some time in the future.
By themselves, therefore, society-led upheavals are virtually incapable of
leading to redemocratization.
Such crises, however, can be avoided by recognizing that an
authoritarian regime will resist political democratization on the grounds
that it will likely result in regime elimination, but may allow a measure of
"
7
"Paths toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative
Consideraticns," in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, edited by G. O'Donnell and P.
Schmitter. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
1986
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liberalization in civil society since it does not obviously and immediately
threaten regime existence.'
According to Stepan, it is the horizontal relations of civil society with
itself, the interactions of diverse associational groups. which helps
interweave the weft and warp of civil society and give it a more variegated
and resistant fabric. 9 These horizontal relations require regime toleration
to develop, and must initially Involve no more than non-threatening efforts
to gain limited policy and social changes. The gradualness of civil society
empowerment makes it difficult for the regime to recognize the point at
which it is no longer able to withdraw societal gains without incurring the
determined resistance of an organized and united civil society.
E. ROBERT A. DAHL
"
8STEPAN. Alfred. Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern
Cone. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1988
9IBID. p. 7.
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Robert A. Dahl's Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition"° discusses
the mutual guarantees that make it possible for an authoritarian regime to
tolerate, and thereby make possible. an opposition to its rule:
Opponents in a conflict cannot be expected to tolerate one another if
one of them believes that toleration of another will lead to his own
destruction or severe suffering. Toleration is more likely to be
extended and to endure only among groups which are not expected to
damage one another severely. Thus the costs of toleration can be
lowered by effective mutual guarantees against destruction, extreme
coercion, or severe damage. Hence, a strategy of liberalization requires
a search for such guarantees."
Dahl stresses the search rather than the specifics, since in each
country the problem is so different as to defy a general solution. In a fully
hegemonic regime12 an important step in this process may be the
"°Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven and London:
Yale University Press. 1971
"DAHL, Robert. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. p. 217.
121n a hegemonic regime the population does not have the
opportunity to formulate or signify preferences, or have their preferences
weighted equally in the conduct of government. These opportunities can
only accrue to a citizenry through the exercise of certain guarantees -
freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, the right
to vote, eligibility to run for public office, right of political leaders to
compete for support and votes, access to alternative sources of
information, free and fair elections, and institutions for making
government policies depend on votes and other expressions of
preference. From Robert Dahl's Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition,
p. 3.
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understanding that those in opposition to the regime will not be subjected
to death or imprisonment, exile, or total destitution.
F. GRAHAM T. ALLISON
In Can the United States Promote Democracy?13 Graham T. Allison
examines ways that the United States can promote democracy without
falling into the trap of believing that elections are the only acceptable
indicator of a move towards democratization. Allison points out that a
sudden, conflictive break with a repressive regime is rarely the best
beginning for a sustainable democracy. A more stable foundation is
achieved through a process of liberalization prior to elections, allowing civil
society to develop the skills needed to effectively control whatever
government might come into power.
If one applies Allison's theory to Cuba, it implies that the United States
must abandon the democratizing strategies developed in response to the
Soviet threat, allowing the weight of the worldwide democratization trend
to pull Cuba into compliance out of necessity rather than attempting to
forcibly push it out of a decaying orbit and into a chaotic free-for-all.
"
3Can the United States Promote Democracy? Political Science
Quarterly, Number 1, 1992.
18
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MII. CUBAN CIVIL SOCIETY
In order to suggest ways in which the United States might encourage
associational groups with a clear stake in a freer society, we must first
examine the condition of civil society in Cuba as it exists today.
It is difficult for an outsider to assess the possibilities for effecting
change that may lie dormant in Cuban society. The totalitarian regime
impinges on every facet of daily life, and there are few opportunities for the
average citizen to participate in activities that are not planned, executed,
and monitored by the regime.' 4
The most basic obstacle to the development of an opposition is the
difficulty for those who silently oppose the regime to identify each other.
This difficulty is compounded by the individual's need to simulate loyalty
and adherence to the regime's policies as a survival mechanism. The regime
fosters a climate of mistrust by erasing the distinction between delinquincy
and counterrevolutionary behavior. All activities not approved and
"I41nformation on the mechanics of regime control and the structuring
of collective behavior from Cuban Communism, edited by Irving Louis
Horowitz. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers. 1989.
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orchestrated by the state are viewed by the authorities with suspicion; the
very term "authorities" reaches down into daily life to include the layers of
neighborhood warders and informants who observe and report on the
minutia of their subjects' lives. A departure from normal or routine
behavior is reported to the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution
having jurisdiction over that neighborhood, and appropriate action taken
to punish behavior that does not conform to the 'goals of the revolution.'
A. ROLE OF MASS ORGANIZATIONS
1. The Committees for the Defense of the Revolution
The Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) are all-
pervasive. A mass organization with a membership of six million, about 80
percent of the adult population,.5 the CDRs constitute an effective tool for
the control and revolutionary socialization of the population. The CDRs act
as the eyes and ears of the regime at the most personal level; they are
designed as a "neighborhood watch" in which neighbors are both the
watching and the watched.
'
5PLANAS, Richard J. '"Why Does Castro Survive?" World Affairs,
Winter 1992. p. 89.
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Every city block has a CDR with an assigned president, secretary,
and treasurer. The police can tap into this network for information on any
individual: infor-mation on the suspect's filends. visitors. family
background, work history and volunteer activities is readily available. as
well as CDR officials' personal assessments of the revolutionary
commitment of each individual within his jurisdiction. This type of
surveillance can be done retrospectively, since the official identification card
of every adult gives the person's residential history.
In addition, the CDRs represent regime bureaucracy at the local level.
The worth of each individual is assessed within the context of regime loyalty
and compliance. and resources are allocated and favors granted based on
that assessment. A certificate from the CDR is required before any building
material to repair or remodel a house can be requested from People's Power,
the organization in charge of their distribution. In order to change
residence. citizens must get permission from the CDR to transfer the family
food identification card to a new address. The local CDR also controls
access to many avenues of upward social mobility; letters of
recommendation from zone committees vouching for an individuals's
correct revolutionary orientation are vital in gaining membership in the
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Union of Communist Youth and in the selection process for professional
university programs.
The power of the CDRs lies in their ability to manipulate the
behavior of the individual: the "favor" of smoothing the transactions of daily
life is provided in return for voluntary community service, conformity to
regime standards of conduct, and participation in collective activities. Not
only does the individual have little time to develop inappropriate interests.
but the assumption of a conformist attitude as a survival mechanism
makes it difficult for potential dissidents to recognize each other, or trust
each other once contact has been established.
The pervasive nature of the CDRs makes it difficult to trust
others; the constant fear of betrayal makes it seem an exercise in self-
destruction for individuals to voice their opposition to the regime. For
those dissidents who have found kindred spirits, there is a lack of
opportunity to meet, plan, and organize without the knowledge of the
CDRs. Even those who have assumed an overt posture of resistance to the
government, such as the human rights and political dissident groups,
operate under the assumption that their groups have been infiltrated by the
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regime."6 With the regime so firmly in control of life's basic necessities.
most choose not to assume the risk of opposition. Discontent, therefore.
remains atomized and is manifested as personal unhappiness rather than
as a focus for organized dissent.
2. The Central Organization of Cuban Trade Unions
Almost every Cuban in the labor force is a member of the CTC.
and it is thus a mass organization that perpetuates collective behavior as
a means of protective coloration. Workers have individual files or work
records which contain information on their work history, level of technical
training and proficiency, frequency of voluntary labor contributions,
absences, and numbers of merits and demerits. This information.
combined with that available from the neighborhood CDR. allows the
authorities to trace the activities and assess the security risk of each
individual.
B. CREATING CONFORMITY THROUGH THE LACK OF ANONYMITY
Even in instances when the individual is part of a vast crowd he is not
anonymous: an uprising during a mass political rally, parade. or
"
6 Planas, Richard. 'Why Does Castro Survive?" World Affairs, Winter
1992. p. 93.
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celebration is highly unlikely given their tightly choreographed nature.
They exemplify the control the regime exerts over the population during
gatherings which might otherwise have proved vehicles for the spontaneous
coalescence of mass discontent.
Individuals participating in mass gatherings are there as members of
neighborhood, school, or work-related groups which hav- ijreassigned
physical locations in the gathering. Before each gathering, members of the
CDR canvass the neighborhood under their control to ascertain which
residents intend to participate in the upcoming event. Pressure to conform
to regime expectations is intense, since failure to participate, to "support"
the regime, will lead to a loss of moral capital in relations with the CDR
and, therefore, in a loss of the advantages only compliance can earn.
A list of participants from each block is submitted to the zone CDR
committee, which arranges transportation. Neighbors and co-workers travel
as a group and are assigned a specific location at the site. In this tightly
controlled situation it would be impossible for an individual to express anti-
regime sentiments without being recognized by those with whom he lived
and worked; every action and statement would be for attribution, and
would have to be weighed in light of its future ramifications. To most such
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exposure would prove an unacceptable risk. the cost too high to justify any
attempt to turn a mass rally into a mass protest. With few other
opportunities to gather on such a large scale, the chance of either
deliberately or spontaneously inciting a mass uprising is remote.
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MV. REPRESSION OF THE GROWTH OF AN EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION
Repression has many tactics, some as blatant as a beating, some as
subtle as creating a preference for the devil that is known. The regime has
been successful in repressing the growth of an opposition because it uses
a combination of "carrots and sticks" to gain compliance. While the threat
of physical violence is very real. and the passivity of mass-based culture
exerts a tiring pull, it is the regime's manipulation of debate that has staved
off active revolt.
A. REGIME CONTROL OF DEBATE
The regime does not attempt to convince the people that all is well, or
that difficult circumstances can be fixed by an omnipotent leadership.
Instead, the regime actively involves the populace in a search for solutions
to the country's problems: thus included, many of the people who might be
predisposed to oppose the regime are coopted by the hope that debate will
lead to change, that their suggestions will be acted upon within the system.
This process of debate-as-sublimation was highlighted by Raul
Castro's speech Llamamiento ("Call"), delivered in the spring of 1990 in
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preparation for the 1991 fourth party congress. In this speech he criticized
the party's "dogmatic" tendency to create "false unanimity" which "may lead
to pretense, double moral standards, or the silencing of opinions." He
called for "democratic discussions" and a nation-wide series of debates on
Cuba's future, with an emphasis on economics.1 7 The debates, however.
were to be "within" the revolution rather than "against" it: the tupic of
debate was how to perfect socialism not with what to replace it. Some of
the suggestions presented during the debate were acted upon by the
regime, though in such a way that they had little impact on the lives of
most citizens. Yet, on paper at least, it appeared to be a sign that the state
listened to the people and was implementing what was feasible.'"
1 GUNN. Gillian. "Cuba in Crisis", Current History, March 1991. p.
104.
18Suggestions included: that authorities be less preoccupied with
maintaining social equality and reward the most produr'tive workers with
significant material benefits: that managers be given more autonomy in
decision making and be less constrained by centralized planning: that
the atrocious quality of services and small-scale manufacturing be
improved by a process of selective privatization: that direct links between
private farmers and consumers be established (this is already happening
via the black market, which the regime tolerates whenever a safety valve
is needed). IBID.
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Complaining about the hardship of daily life appears to be a favorite
pastime in Cuba; visitors to the island seem to be deliberately targeted by
Cubans wishing to vent their frustrations about the scarcity of soap, pork,
a nice pair of shoes, a favorite beer, the scarcity, in fact, of everything but
personal freedom and repre'entational democracy. Tile regime tolerates
these complaints, perhaps because they believe that it channels discontent
away from substantive issues.
B. CONTROL THROUGH RATIONING
One of the most effective methods of controlling the populace is the
regime's penetration of every corner of daily life. There is very little
personal space within which citizens can make choices independent of the
state.
The regime effectively limits geographical mobility through a system of
controls on the basic necessities of survival. Citizens are tied to their
neighborhoods by a system of identification cards which designates the
shopping center they are allowed to use and the day and time they are
allowed to purchase certain items. 1q
'
9 RUDOLPH, James D., ed. Cuba: A Country Study. Foreign Areas
Studies, The American University. 1987. p. 105.
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Rationing as an instrument of repression is successful on several
levels: (1) the ID system allows the regime to restrict the movements of its
citizens: they must be where they are suppose to be in order to buy their
rations: (2) through the use of ID cards the regime is able to punish
dissenters, denying them access to food, clothing, and materials with which
they might otherwise be able to make a living: (3) by denying dissenters
access to goods. the regime forces them to spend most of their time
trying to secure provisions through other, illegal. means. Dissidents then
have no time to organize; they are reduced tc the time-consuming existence
of a forager. By forcing the dissident to seek goods illegally, on the black
market, the regime has also provided itself a crime with which to charge the
dissident, should justification be needed: (4) the over-all effect of this
dependence on the regime for basic necessities is the creation of obedient,
compliant citizens who, whatever their personal feelings concerning the
regime, are too consumed with the mechanics of daily survival, and too
fearful of having those mechanics break down, to offer any resistance.
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V. ATTITUDES WITHIN THE CIVILIAN POPULATION
Public transportation in Cuba has been decimated by the scarcity of
oil and spare parts. Citizens queue for long hours at bus stops and off-
ramps waiting for a ride that often never materializes. Bus routes are
cancelled without notice and every lorry, private vehicle, and oxcart is
packed. Poor logistics require that citizens expend many extra hours
standing in line for rations, only to discover that their portion is inadequate
or has somehow been lost in the distribution pipeline. Many workplaces
send workers home early rather than have to provide them the traditional
free lunch. After struggling into their workplaces, many discover that the
production line has been shut down due to lack of inputs. These workers
are often then "conscripted" into service in the agricultural sector, sent into
the countryside to labor in the cane fields. Though they continue to receive
their old pay there are no consumer goods to buy with their earnings. It is
apparent to many Cubans that the socialist system has failed, and that the
prospects for recovery under the current regime are dim. Why then is there
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such apathy, such unwillingness to upset a status quo that is fair only in
its equal division of privation?
A. REGIME LEGITIMACY
The regime's legitimacy is personified and anchored by one man -
Fidel Castro - whose claims tc moral authority and historical legitimacy are
not without foundation. Prior to the revolution many of Castro's supporters
were members of the social, economic, and political underclass, with little
hope for their children's future: now their children are doctors, engineers.
teachers, and party elites. Castro delivered many of the promises of the
revolution - universal education, free health care, and a more equal
distribution of resources, He is viewed as a father figure who. though
inflexible and seemingly out of touch with reality, has the country's best
interests at heart.2 °
The regime's legitimacy Is further enhanced by the peoples' fear of the
unknown, or the perception that the alternatives to socialism will leave
20Though this conclusion is based largely on anecdotal evidence,
many Cubans, while excoriating the economy, the communist party, and
socialism, seem unwilling to fault Castro with anything other than
holding on to a fine ideal whose time had passed.
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many completely disenfranchised. Many hope that there is a 'third way'.
socialism with an affluent face.
Enrique, a writer and translator, though critical of the regime's
response to world changes, is certain that it is all that stands between the
people and foreign domination. "Unlike Eastern Europe we are not
debating a return to capitalism. I can't think of any way of living other
than in socialism... One thing is clear to most al Cubans: socialism and
national independence in Cuba are inseparable. The confusion is over how
to make socialism work. Some think you do so by opening up and giving
more power to the people. Others think you do that by yelling slogans at
the people. But this much is for sure: when the Yankees machine-gun a
Cuban boat, or when Bush puts a balloon in the sky to impose TV Marti on
us, 1. for one, don't feel the need any longer to debate with the dogmatists.
My conflict with them evaporates... In this sense, the greatest support for
our dogmatists comes from the United States.",2 '
2 1COOPER, Marc. "Fidel -si?" New Statesman Society,
11 May 1990. p. 33.
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B. NATIONALISM
Castro's power is linked to Cuban nationalism and the banner of anti-
imperialism: he has stated that "the end of socialism, the end of the
revolution, would be the end of the Cuban Nation.",22 The United States
has played a major role in firing this nationalism. The embargo provides
Castro both a scapegoat and a focus for anger; though many Cubans
recognize the effect of the break-up of the Soviet Union on the economy, the
continuation of U.S. pressure in a "new world" where even China has Most
Favored Nation status seems an indication of hostile intent and complete
intractability. Statements from outside Cuba concerning Castro's fall and
a U.S.-backed recovery do not convey a message of hope as intended, rather
they are judged within the context of survival, safety, esteem, and liberation
from oppression.
In particular, there is a vein of nationalism which is directed against
the former Cuban elites who fled into exile during the early years of the
revolution and who now make winner-take-all statements concerning their
role in Cuba after Castro's fall. Though in the minority, these exiles are the
"
2PURCELL, Susan Kaufman. "Cuba's Cloudy Future," Foreign
Affairs, Summer 1990. p. 122.
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wealthiest, the most politically influencial, and the loudest. In May 1991
the Cuban American National Foundation, based in Miami and made up of
the most right-wing elements of the exile community, established a
committee to plan for the rebuilding of a post-Castro Cuba: members
include former U.S. ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Senators
Connie Mack and Bob Graham. Representatives Ileana Ros Lehtinen and
Dante Fascell, Jeb Bush, and former President Ronald Reagan.2"
Jorge Mas Canosa. the Foundation's chairman, said that the
committee was established to make business recommendations and
simplify the chaotic transition from communism to capitalism, saying, 'We
must rebuild the country through the resources of the private sector. We
must re-create in Cuba the miracle of Cuban exile private business success
in Miami.'"24 With little hard currency in Cuba it is obvious that the
Committee's plans are aimed at an external private sector, not one they
intend to develop within Cuba. The Foundation does not plan to allow
anyone "friendly" with Castro to get a head start - Alberto Marino Sr., an
2 3Marie-Claude Decamps, "Little Havana in Miami." in the
Manchester Guardian, 15 September 199 1.
24Alfonso Chardy, "Planning a Post-Castro Bonanza," in the Miami
Herald, 29 September 1991.
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ally of Mas on the Foundation's board of directors, has said that any private
investor "doing business in Cuba now will not be doing business after
Castro. We're going to see to that."'25
This assessment of their own political clout may be overstated, yet the
picture presented to Havana is one of a hostile force poised to seize territory
through an invasion of superior finances. Many Cubans may well fear that
they will cease to be a Nation and will find themselves once more subsumed
and subservient to the United States if they do not support the Castro
regime's anti-American stance.
C. THE EXAMPLE OF EASTERN EUROPE
Castro learned the lessons of regime breakdown from the transitions
that took place in Eastern Europe. and he has taken steps to ensure that
the cascade effects of liberalization do not begin in Cuba: 1) undertake as
few political reforms as possible; 2) get rid of party deadwood and potential
25Lee Hockstader, "Cuban Exiles Split on Life After Castro," in The
Washington Post, 10 March 1992.
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rivals early on, before forced to do so; 3) deal harshly with potential or
evident disloyalty: and 4) don't allow formal opposition to organize. 2h
The media has been flooded with all the "bad news" from the former
Soviet Union - civil wars, unemployment. inflation, ethnic conflict,
elimination of consumer subsidies and pension payments, and an increase
in violent crime. In contrast to this devastation, the Castro regime offers
a safety net to those who display the proper respect for the revolution and
the system it created. Cuba's system shields its citizens from wide social
gaps; though there is an elite in relative terms, the enormous gulf between
rich and poor that is found in other Latin American countries does not exist
in Cuba.
Though food is scarce, there is a perception that it is fairly divided
among all. The regime has also virtually guaranteed a job to all who want
to work, often for inflated wages.2" Many of these positions are with the
26DOMINGUEZ, Jorge I. 'The Secrets of Castro's Staying Power,"
Foreign Affairs, Spring 1993. p. 99.
"
27This practice of full employment may actually hurt the economy: of
3.5 million active in the workforce, 1.1 million are classified by the
national census office as holding "unproductive" jobs. including research
of such topics as 15th-century French classical music or ancient
Chinese poetry. From "Is Cuba Next?" by Mark Falcoff. Published in
Commentary, November 1992.
37
state's bloated bureaucracy, creating another large group whose continued
security depends on the status quo.
Cuba's Black population, comprising 40 percent of the total, fears the
return of the mostly white, exile elite. Afro-Cubans have gained the most
from the revolution in relative terms; they fear, and perhaps rightly, that
Castro's fall would herald a return to deliberate social and economic
stratification.
Castro asks them, 'What lands are they going to seize? What are they
going to do with the houses the revolution has given the people? Are they
going to turn the child-care centers into brothels?""2
Regime elites have also heard an important message-reformers usually
don't last past the first elections. The difficulty of rebuilding a shattered
economy, coupled with the concomitant "betrayal" of social advances,
makes it almost impossible to be both an effective reformer and a
successful politician.
Another importawnt lesson conveyed to potential reformers by the
Eastern European model was that U.S. financial aid could not be counted
"
28Richard Boudreaux, "Can Castro Weather the Storm?" in the Los
Angeles Times, 6 April 1992.
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on as a given. The Cuban media portrays U.S. efforts to assist the former
Soviet Union as anemic at best: once the perception of threat was gone. the
U.S. seemed willing to allow Russia to sink or swim in the free-market
ocean. Cuban reformers might therefore fear that the only U.S. "aid" they
could count on in a post-Castro situation would come straight from Miami.
The Cuban American National Foundation claims to have buyers
willing to pay $15 billion for 60 percent of Cuba's land and assets.2
When asked if he would run for office in Cuba after Castro's fall, CANF
chairman Jorge Mas Canosa said he had not decided but, 'There's no one
in Cuba who can take over.""0 Given the influence of the Foundation in
writing the legislation which tightened the embargo in 1992, and the
perception that Washington's Cuba policy was designed to appease the
powerful exile lobby in Miami, potential Cuban reformers may well consider
exiles as presenting more of a threat to their security than the current
regime.
29Ernesto F. Betancourt, "Let Cuba Be Cuba," in the New York Times,
6 September 1991.
30Marie-Claude Decamps, "Little Havana in Miami," in the Manchester
Guardian, 15 September 1991.
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VI. OPPOSITION AMONG THE CIVILIAN POPULATION
Prior to the revolution of 1959 Cuba did not have a tradition of strong
civil society; thirty-three years of repression and cooptation have further
atrophied the institutions that proved key to democratic transition in
Eastern Europe: the Catholic Church. labor unions, private-sector
organizations. international associational groups connected with science
and the arts, and active dissident groups.
Dissident groups do exist in Cuba but their activity is clandestine and
underground; often they are known only through references made by
Castro concerning "cockroaches who try to create fifth columns at the
service of imperialism."'" Even the most "counterrevolutionary" citizen
has little idea what Cuba's only organized opposition - human rights
activists - stands for. To many Cubans they are "just like the
3 1 PURCELL, Susan Kafman. "Cuba's Cloudy Future." Foreign
Affairs, Summer 1990. p. -,3.
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counterrevolutionaries who planted bombs in cinemas just after the
revolution. They have nothing to offer Cuba.'"2
Unfamiliar to most Cubans. dissidents are often unrecognized by each
other as well. The system fosters conformity. with each individual obliged
to display loyalty to the regime in order to conduct the business of day-to-
day life. Through the CDRs, the regime is able to monitor movement.
habits, and participation in conventionalizing activities such as mass
rallies, volunteer work, and political gatherings. From this information the
regime then determines the appropriate way in which to deal with each
individual: reward or punish.
Rewards may include a letter of recommendation for educational
opportunities or employment, permission to move (by issuing an ID card
which reflects a transfer to another ration distribution site), or allotment of
scare materials for home repair.
Punishment includes the withholding of these "favors", since the state
holds a virtual monopoly on education, jobs, and resources, this expulsion
32 GUNN. Gillian. "Cuba's Search for Alternatives," Current History,
February 1992. p. 63.
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from the social net leaves "troublemakers" scrambling for survival, with
little time or wherewithal to challenge the regime.
Those individuals who persist in defying the regime are subjected to
"spontaneous acts of repudiation". harassment or physical assault by Rapid
Reaction Brigades formed by the neighborhood CDRs and augmented by
plainclothes security forces. Dozens of activists have been put on the
"pajama plan" - denied work. harassed, and all but confined to their homes
for days by the well-organized and indefatigable Brigades.:" Though many
dissidents have been badly beaten by regime-orchestrated mobs the
objective of this strategy is to cow through the threat of violence, instilling
the realization that worse could have happened and still might. Disidents
have been beaten, but not so savagely as to be characterized as torture.
That might give potential activists the impression that the struggle had
reached life-or-death proportions, moderated violence, on the other hand.
provides just enough of an example to keep them safely on the fence.
In the end it Is safer to keep opinions a private matter rather than risk
ostracism and hardship for no apparent gain. One opponent of the regime.
"
3Lee Hockstader, "Castro Turns His People's Love Into Fear." in the
Washington Post, 13 September 1991.
42
vocal and articulate when speaking with a visitor, admitted that "nobody
in the neighborhood knows my views - I keep them to myself."' Another
says, "You never talk to a neighbor about politics unless it is someone you
know very well, like a brother. That's a rule. You never know who is
listening and whom they might tell."'3  Multiplied by ten million Cubans.
this fear of exposure repi esents a grass-roots movement for change that will
never develop.
Obscure in Cuba. the preferred stratagems of the human rights groups
are often ignored by policymakers in the United States, who refuse to adopt
the tactics of dialogue which might gain internal dissidents the political
space needed to negotiate liberalization with the Castro regime.
A. DECLARATION OF GOODWILL
On January 19, 1992, the most prominent leaders of Cuba's human
rights and dissident movement signed a "Declaration of Goodwill", which
expressed the following:
34GUNN, Gillian. "Cuba's Search for Alternatives," Current History,
February 1992. p. 63.
"
35Lee Hockstader, "Castro Turns His People's Love Into Fear," in the
Washington Post, 13 September 1991.
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I. 'The organizations, groups. and movements in Cuba which watch
over the respect for human rights and work for peaceful change
reaffirm in this Declaration that they have not used and shall never
use violent methods, and reject on principle, any form of violence."
2. The signers confirm their "willingness to hold talks as a means of
solving Cuba's domestic problems and proclaim their aspiration to
reconciliation among all Cubans."
3. The signers affirm that "isolation and deprivation shall not be
instrumental in enabling the Cuban people to take, in freedom and
peace, the steps they desire and need to overcome the crisis which
they are enduring."
4. The signers ask the U.S. government to "reaffirm that it has no
intention to intervene militarily in Cuba" and to express "Its
willingness to initiate talks with the Cuban government to resolve the
differences between both countries on the basis of mutual respect for
the determination of each nation."
5. They acknowledge the Latin American countries' "willingness to
mediate for the purpose of achieving a fair solution to the differences
between Cuba and the United States, and acknowledge the
willingness of the countries of Latin America to cooperate as friends
in order to enable Cubans to carry out freely any change that they
may desire in their society."
6. They are grateful for the moral support of the "countries of Western
Europe, Canada, and Spain in particular."
7. They ask that Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet
Union promise "to make every possible effort to lessen the
restrictions and shortages which Cuba is enduring.. . In the same
manner and at the same time, these countries should endeavor to
contribute with their goodwill efforts, while respecting the self-
determination of the Cuban people, for the purpose of achieving
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tolerance.., reconciliation and dialogue within Cuba. which are the
only means of solution desired by Cubans.'"6
This document highlights the difficult position the regime's opposition
finds itself in-rather than acting as a mediator between the regime and its
moderating forces, the United States has forced the dissident movement to
expend much of its energy countering charges that it is a to4L. of U.S.
imperialism and aggression. Though the internal movement has played
little role in shaping U.S. policy towards Cuba, Castro uses its activism as
proof that there are destructive forces within the country that threaten the
regime and, therefore, the nation. Defining the dissident movement as an
extension of U.S. intervention allows Castro to justify his crackdown on
activists, and taints the movement in the eyes of many Cubans. Rather
than representing the desire for self-determination and peaceful change
among Cubans, the movement is seen as representing the chaos and
hardships of an externally-dictated "revolution."
36Ramon Cernuda, "Dissidents on the Island See Threat to
Democracy," in the Miami Herald. 2 March 1992.
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B. MIGRATION
Another important avenue of activism has been lost due to the high
incidence of defection from Cuba. During the first five years of the
revolutionary government, an estimated 200,000 Cubans emigrated; many
were the members of the intellectual and technical elite who might have
provided an educated and motivated core of dissention.3 This emigration
then allowed Castro to place his supporters, most of whom owed their
social, economic, and political rise to the revolution, into key positions in
the government. This brain-drain continues today: the migration of young.
highly-educated adults denies the opposition the very people who otherwise
would have provided the backbone of an opposition movement.
Talented young Cubans, sent to Moscow during the 1980s to train as
the regime's ideological and technical cadre, were instead exposed to
glasnost, perestroika, and the rejection of communism by the Soviet Union.
Rather than return to Cuba as the vanguard of a liberalization movement.
however, over 500 sought political asylum in Russia; over 300 have since
emigrated to the United States with the assistance of the Cuban American
3 7HOROWITZ, Irving Louis, ed. Cuban Communism. New Brunswick
and London: Transaction Publishers. 1989. p. 75.
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National Foundation."' Although many of the students have banded
together to form a dissident group called Union Cubana. their activities are
limited to demonstrating at the Cuban Embassy in Moscow and helping
others escape from Cuba. The first has no effect on internal dissent in
Cuba because the incidents are simply not reported. The second depletes
Cuba's already low supply of potential activists. In the words of one
student who dreams of a free Cuba, "Castro is not immortal. My dream is
to return to Cuba. a Cuba where no one dictates what I must say or do. ",
Whether frightened of the regime's intolerance or simply pessimistic about
the chances of reforming the system from within, these students haw
forfeited the opportunity to play a constructive role in bringing that freedom
to Cuba.
Those who might otherwise have provided the focus for an opposition
movement have rendered themselves non-players by seeking political
asylum. Doctors, artists, pilots, athletes, writers, engineers, scientists.
musicians, students, and regime moderates: all were allowed some freedom
"
38Elizabeth Shogren, "Cubans Raise Protest Voice - in Moscow." in the
Los Angeles Times, 4 September 1992.
391BID.
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of travel, were valued and respected by the regime and. presumably. were
outside of Cuba might have enabled them to focus international considered
trustworthy. Had they remained in Cuba and been voices for liberalization.
they might have been able to effect positive changes in the system. Their
contacts and renown attention on the agendas of internal opposition
groups, and their high profiles would have made it difficult for the regime
to harass them with impunity. After defection, however, they became non-
persons in Cuba. their books and records were removed from circulation as
was the influence they might have had on society and the regime.
C. COOPTATION
Musicians and artists who might otherwise have provided a focus for
and popular interpretation of regime opposition have been coopted by a
series of recent concessions. Where once the government had the right to
keep all fees from performances. exhibitions, and sales overseas, the artist
is now allowed to keep his earnings provided he does not break with the
regime. Regulations requiring performers to permanently reside on the
island have been relaxed, and some have taken vacation homes elsewhere.
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Sponsored by the government at home and allowed to make a profit
abroad, Cuba's artistic community is relatively well-off. In effect they, too.
depend on the status quo for their position and for continued security.
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VII. U.S. POLICY
A. THE CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT
Until pressured by the election year need not to be "outdone" on any
issue by Bill Clinton, President George Bush's policy on Cuba was largely
predicated on the belief that Castro's fall was inevitable. With Soviet
economic aid and military support gone, and the world in a free-fall towards
democracy, it seemed unlikely that Cuba could survive for long in a world
that had abandoned communism. There was little reason for the United
States to play the role of "heavy" in bringing about a regime change in
Cuba: the island could no longer be considered a Soviet staging area,
Cuban troops were out of Africa, and the surrogate wars in Latin America
were over. As one senior administration official said. 'The ball is in Fidel's
court. I don't think you will see a radical review of U.S. policy towards
Cuba."40
'
0Norman Kempster, "U.S. Adopts Hands-Off Cuba Policy," in the Los
Angeles Times, 14 September 1991.
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In fact, the Bush administration was deliberately avoiding saber-
rattling to keep Castro from turning the prospect of intervention to political
advantage. "I don't think we want to come out too aggressively." a State
Department official said, 'There are some countries that feel sorry for Cuba.
and we want to avoid other countries picking up the slack" left by the
Soviets.4"
President Bush rebuffed early efforts to tighten the embargo because
he did not want to antagonize important allies who had business dealings
with Cuba. However, in an effort to placate the Cuban-American
constituency, he took a minor step towards concession by limiting the
amount U.S.-based agencies acting as intermediaries with Havana could
charge for travel papers and plane fare to the island. It was the first in a
series of concessions that ended when Bush surrendered the formation of
foreign policy to the final arbitration of electioneering.
The basic conflict rested in the divergent goals of the Bush
administration and the proponents of the bill. The former sought the
4 1Christopher Marquis, "U.S. Avoids Tough Talk on Castro," in the
Miami Herald, 22 September 1991.
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establishment of a viable democracy in Cuba while the latter sought the
downfall of Fidel Castro at any cost to the island's populace.
Edward Gonzalez, an analyst at the RAND Corporation who prepared
a report commissioned by the Defense Department on policy options
towards Cuba warned, 'We should not become so fixated with Castro's
downfall that we undermine the prospect for a free, democratic Cuba. If we
ratchet up the pressure [on Castrol too much, the wrench will snap and
we will have a crisis on our hands.'4 2
The Bush administration was becoming concerned at the heightened
expectations among U.S. conservatives and Cuban exiles that the
"liberation" of Cuba was imminent. The conservatives wanted to use the
lever of promised U.S. humanitarian aid to the Soviet Union to accelerate
the troop withdrawal from Cuba and to ensure the end to Soviet subsidies
to the Cuban economyY. Given their willingness to jeopardize the
democratization trend in eastern Europe, it must have been obvious to
President Bush that there were elements within the government aligned
42Quoted in IBID.
'Martin Walker, "Pressures Mount in US to Hasten Cuba's Slide," in
the Manchester Guardian, 22 September 1991.
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with powerful special interest groups whose political loyalty could only be
bought with a more pro-active role in Cuba's destabilization.
In mid-April of 1992 President Bush issued a pair of executive orders
whose broad intent was to destabilize Cuba: the first barred ships that had
previously stopped in Cuba from docking in U.S. ports. and the second
allowed U.S. residents to send packages directly to Cuba, eliminating the
need to send them via a third country."
The real intent of these orders, however, was to head off the need to
endorse the more controversial, and damaging, provisions of the bill. Bush
had received advance warning that Clinton would endorse the bill, and the
executive orders essentially said, "I will not be upstaged by Bill Clinton."
The administration's Cuba experts spent days wrangling with
congressional aides trying to reach a compromise on the bill before its first
vote in the House. They opposed the provisions that sought to compel U.S.
allies and U.S. subsidiaries abroad to embrace the U.S. embargo of Cuba,
"Tom Fiedler, "How Candidates Were Squeezed on Cuba Policy," in
the Miami Herald, 26 April 1992.
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measures which administration officials knew to be both politically unwise
and, possibly, illegal.4"
The State Department faced fierce objections from Canada. Great
Britain and Spain, which hosted U.S. subsidiaries that did hundreds of
millions of dollars of business with Cuba. Clearly. the United States'
interests would not be served by an escalation of tensions based on Cold
War rationale.
Once more, however, the bill's proponents were attempting to
stampede Bush, choosing to see his domestic concessions as "something
down on the Cuban Democracy Act," said Jose. capitulation rather than
compromise. "Everyone's fired up about Bush's tone and his visible
willingness to get Cardenas", spokesman for the Cuban American National
Foundation. 'There is obviously an intention to craft some definitive
statement for U.S. policy."4"
In early May of 1992, Bush submitted to the logic of electioneering: in
a policy flip-flop he dropped his opposition to the bill's controversial
4 5Christopher Marquis. "Bush Lead on Cuba Policy 'Astute'," in the
Miami Herald, 21 April 1992.
46BID
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provisions, extending American jurisdiction beyond the boundaries of the
United States to cover foreign subsidiaries of American companies.
In an election year, he was willing to forego the development of sound
long-term policy goals in favor of the uncertain cultivation of short-term
political gains.
B. COMPREHENSIVE ENGAGEMENT
A more forwarding-looking example of U.S. involvement in the
"rehabilitation" of non-democratic regimes is its policy regarding communist
China. In a letter to the House of Representatives disapproving additional
conditions for renewal of China's Most Favored Nation status. President
Bush justified a policy of "comprehensive engagement" as being more likely
to encourage liberalization than a policy of confrontation.4 7
Comprehensive engagement, which drives the wedge of influence with
the hammer of interdependence, encourages positive change through
contact with American democratic, economic, and educational institutions.
The policy's most attractive feature is its non-impositional nature: it seeks
to change through example rather than by fiat, and acknowledges that both
"
4 7Letter quoted in U.S. Department of State Dispatch. 5 October 1992.
p. 759.
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countries have something to gain from the relationship. For Cuba. the
United States' demand for regime transition would no longer constitute a
zero sum game, but an opportunity to move forward as a system-in-
progress rather than as system forced to remain resolutely intractable for
the sake of survival.
Though admitting that China had taken only limited steps on human
rights issues, Bush stated that active dialogue gave the U.S. an avenue to
express its views directly to China's leaders. The U.S. has no such
opportunity for constructive dialogue with Cuba: total capitulation is
demanded, accusations are made, and the United States presents itself as
being completely unwilling to take a step forward until the Castro regime
has been replaced. The U.S.. then, has no influence over the Castro regime
except in the negative - if an action, idea, or statement appears to have
originated with the U.S. it is regarded by the Cuban government as being
deliberately subversive. The Chinese government, by comparison,
understands that listening isn't surrender and that the U.S. will not seize
upon any effort towards compliance as a sign of exploitable weakness.
Small steps forward are thus able to gain momentum because the regime
does not fear that the next step will be its last.
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In his letter to the House of Representatives. Bush expressed concern
that withdrawal of the MFN status would endanger the market-oriented
zones created by the regime and would undermine those Chinese who
promote reform and rely on outside contact for support. Additionally. he
acknowledged that it would endanger U.S. access to a growing market and
cost thousands of American jobs.
On 27 May 1993. President Bill Clinton said that he would renew
China's favorable trade status for one year to help its modernization efforts.
but suggested that future renewal would be contingent upon China's
progress in the area of human rights.48 China's regime thus has aore to
gain than lose in reforming its policy concerning the treatment of its own
citizens, and the United States has gained influence in guiding China's
transition from communism to a market economy. Were this policy to be
applied to Cuba it would undermine much of Castro's nationalistic appeal:
the U.S. would be able to present Itself as concerned but not overbearing.
its attempts to influence reforms appropriate within the context of an
ongoing, mutually advantageous relationship.
4Letter quoted in U.S. Department of State Dispatch. 5 October 1992.
p. 759.
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VIII. PROGNOSIS: U.S. PLANS GO AWRY
Capitulation by the Castro regime may not be played out in a manner
that Washington considers advantageous. Castro might offer to convene a
plebiscite on his rule or hold elections; with little in the way of organized
opposition, limited access to mass media by nascent activists, continued
repression by the security forces and the perceived need to present a united
front to the 'enemy', this might provide Castro with the opportunity to play
by "Washington's rules" at no real risk to his power. He might further
ensure that such a gesture resulted in a favorable outcome by insisting
"that the plebiscite or elections be held within a short time period, and that
the United States first lift the embargo and grant trade credits in order to
ease economic conditions prior to balloting. He could insist on limiting the
number and efficacy of international observers on grounds that Cuba's
sovereignty must not be violated, and he could limit the opposition's access
to state-controlled media, while Party-directed mass organizations would
be deployed to intimidate the populace and control balloting."" 'This may
49GONZALEZ, Edward. Cuba Adrift in a Postcommunist World. Santa
Monica: The Rand Corporation. p. 52.
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be a bad year for Castro to fall because there's nothing to take his place.
You have weak opposition parties and a feeling among the communist
leadership that they don't want another strongman."'5
The United States has focused its policy on bringing about the fall of
Fidel Castro, largely ignoring the question of how that fall might occur and
what its consequences night mean to future stability and democratization.
'The future in Cuba depends on how the transition is carried out. If
there's a peaceful evolutionary change, your chances of creating pluralism
and democracy and open markets are greatly enhanced.'"'
"Evolutionary change" is understood to mean a gradual unfolding or
formation of events based on the progression of ideas, necessity, and
circumstances towards a logical conclusion, which is itself not an ending
but rather a point along a continuous, non-ending line. Current U.S. policy
is based on the notion that "evolution" can be delayed until certain pre-
conditions have been met, in this instance, until the U.S. is certain that
5 0Edward Gonzalez. Quoted in "Castro's Exit Could Cause Morning-
After Headaches," in the Los Angeles Times, 7 April 1992.
5 1Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs. Quoted in the Los Angeles Tlimes,
7 April 1992.
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Fidel Castro will not play a role in negotiating Cuba's future. To minimize
the chaos and violence of a change in Cuba's government, the United States
must accept that, by its very definition, evolution is already in progress:
though the U.S. is unlikely to play a major part in determining the course
of transition, it may well find that its current policies and attitudes will
make dealing with circumstances post-Castro even more difficult than the
perceived vexations encountered during his rule. Those circumstances are
likely to include: (a) political instability; (b) an influx of refugees: and. (c)
the danger of U.S. intervention.
A. POLITICAL INSTABILITY
Fidel Castro's exit could set off a violent struggle for power. Though
his brother Raul is next in the line of succession, his reign may be a brief
one - though an influential player, Raul lacks the historic and charismatic
legitimacy that Fidel enjoys among the majority of Cuba's people. There
will be other individuals and factions within the military and party who will
realize that Raul does not provide the absolutist glue needed to keep the
Cuban people from turning against a regime that is no longer able to
provide the social goods promised by the revolution yet maintains its
fruitless rule through repression.
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Coherent alternatives to Castro and socialism have not yet developed
in Cuba. Regime opposition is represented by an embryonic and diffused
human rights movement which has been poorly represented to the
population, many of whom equate dissent with delinquency. Though
lauded by the international community for their courage in the face of
regime repression, activists are viewed primarily as hapless victims rather
than successors to power.
Though the U.S. Interests Section in Havana maintains contact with
dissident organizations it does not provide assistance to any group, as to
do so would compromise their position as independent voices for change.5 2
This is a wise move in light of Castro's accusations that internal dissident
movements are externally controlled yet, when combined with the social
and cultural embargo imposed by Washington. it makes it difficult for the
U.S. to identify and cultivate the important players or analyze their agendas
and the parameters of their potential actions. The U.S. is thus unable to
influence the course of events but can merely respond as they unfold.
52Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, D.C., 8 April 1992, by Robert S. Gelbard, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. Reprinted in U.S.
Department of State Dispatch. 20 April 1992.
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Recommendations published by the Inter-American Dialogue in "Cuba
in the Americas: Reciprocal Challenges." may provide alternatives to the
United States' out-dated and counterproductive Cuba policy:
The president and other senior U.S. officials should continue to make
clear that the U.S. has no intention of invading cuba. and vigorously
condemn actions by exile groups.
The U.S. government should actively promote the free flow of
information and ideas to the Cuban people by exempting from its
embargo all transactions that foster communications between the
Cuban people and people from the U.S. and other countries, including
tourism. Beyond communications and travel, the U.S. government
should only ease its embargo in response to positive steps taken by
the Cuban government. Washington can best encourage such steps by
working cooperatively with other governments of the hemisphere-and
allowing them to take the lead in some areas.
In its policy, the U.S. should give greater weight to humanitarian
concerns by making it easier for charitable groups to deliver food and
medicine to the Cuban people and for Cuban-Americans to assist
relatives and friends in Cuba.
U.S. broadcasting to Cuba must be responsible. Radio Marti should
be a source of objective news. not propaganda. TV Marti, which
violates international conventions, should be canceled.
The United States should not allow its Cuba policy to hamper relations
with other governments. We oppose legislation to prohibit all trade
with Cuba by subsidiaries of U.S. firms in other countries.5a
53Excerpted from "Cuba in the Americas: Reciprocal Challenges,"
published by the Inter-American Dialogue, in Washington, October 1992.
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B. REFUGEES
Whether Castro goes quietly or is forced from power there will almost
certainly be a rapid, uncontrolled exodus of Cubans to the United States:
the manner of his exit, however, will play a large role in determining the
U.S.' response to the deluge.
Even if the change is peaceful the U.S., particularly the state of
Florida, would see a flood of Cubans seeking work to raise money for
starting businesses back home. The United States would have to decide
whether to continue its policy of granting automatic political asylum to
Cubans whose flight was now motivated more by economic than political
considerations. Even if criteria were established to stem the flood, many
hundreds of thousands would remain eligible for entry under Washington's
family reunification program.5 4
If change does not occur peacefully, the United States might find itself
in the position of having to facilitate a mass escape from the island. The
politically powerful exile community might demand that U.S. ships stand
off Cuba to ensure the safety of those attempting to flee, with matters
"'
4Richard Boudreaux, "Castro's Exit Could Cause Morning-After
Headaches," in the Los Angeles Times, 7 April 1992.
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complicated by the sailing of a civilian "rescue fleet" from the U.S. seeking
to pick up friends and relatives. If Cuba were in the throes of civil war
these efforts would be construed as interventionist, raising questions as
to the U.S.' role in the conflict.
C. THE DANGER OF U.S. INTERVENTION
If a democracy movement was perceived as battling against the
repressive remnants of a totalitarian state, would the U.S. feel compelled
to assist the forces for democracy? "If a civil war occurs, and Cubans are
being slaughtered, there will be pressure from Cubans in Miami to send in
the Marines," said a State Department official. 'Will we? Who knows?",55
President Bush said, 'When Castro falls, we are prepared to help
instantly in the rebuilding of a tree and democratic Cuba.ý''S This
statement ignores the very real possibility that Castro's successor may
prove no more amenable to U.S. direction, particularly if it inherited an





In recent years, Cuban relations with the rest of Latin America have
steadily improved-military governments hostile to the Castro regime have
collapsed, left-wing guerrilla movements that had been identified with Cuba
are in decline, and Cuba displayed the proper solidarity with sovereignty
concerns by supporting Argentina during the Falklands conflict.57 Cuba
has full diplomatic and trade relations with the majority of Latin America.
which voted overwhelmingly to elect Cuba to the UN Security Council in
1989 and is moving to reintegrate Cuba into the OAS.5 `
These efforts to bring Cuba back into the fold have been led by the Rio
Group - Mexico, Colombia, Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil. and Peru - under
the belief that they can influence Cuba's internal political system through
diplomatic and economic interchange rather than through isolation and
pressure. Spain, one of Cuba's most important foreign investors, also
encourages internal reform through positive influence rather than isolation.
Spain combines this with efforts to help Cuba's human rights community,
57GUNN, Gillian, "Will Castro Fall?" Foreign Policy, Summer 1990. p.
137.
5aSMITH, Wayne S. 'Washington and Havana: Time for Dialogue,"
World Policy Journal, Summer 1990. p. 561.
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publicizing incidents of human rights abuses and facilitating delivery of
supplies to the activists.!"
With socialism recognized as unproductive and Cuban-inspired
revolutions no longer a threat, the emphasis in Latin America is
increasingly on sovereignty, economic development, and independence: U.S.
policy towards Cuba is viewed as counterproductive, and indicative of
continued imperialistic and hegemonic assumptions that are losing
relevance in the post-Cold War world. U.S. policy, particularly the Cuban
Democracy Act, gives Latin America an interest in Cuba it might otherwise
not have had; the region has now been handed a situation it can use to
"level the playing field" with the United States, enhancing Latin American
status as a moderator and asserting nationalism and independence from
the U.S. by opposing it on the Cuban issue. David R. Mares' "Middle Powers
under Regional Hegemony: To Challenge or Acquiesce in Hegemonic
Enforcement,"' sums up the difficulties that arise when the United States
59GUNN, Gillian. "Cuba's Search for Alternatives," Current History,
February 1992. p. 63.
6°"Middle Powers under Regional Hegemony: To Challenge or
Acquiesce in Hegemonic Enforcement," International Studies Quarterly,
1988.
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attempts to coerce other states into participating in sanctions against a
country that only the U.S. regards as a threat. The hypothesis states that
the "behavior of the units (states) and the outcomes of their interaction will
vary according to the structure of an international system and the positions
the relevant units occupy within it."
With the end of the bipolar international system, communist-inspired
insurgencies are no longer viewed by Latin American middle powers as the
principal threat to their sovereignty; rather, in Mares' words, their "location
in a regional hegemony constitutes the chief potential threat to their
sovereignty." Since the United States' position as the only remaining
superpower makes it the de facto hegemon of the world, it can be
extrapolated that all other states will consider it in their best interests to
thwart U.S. efforts at hegemonic enforcement. The UN's condemnation of
the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 should, therefore, have come as no
surprise.
Mexico, which voted against the United States in the United Nations
resolution calling for an end to the U.S. embargo, has used the issue to
challenge the U.S.' right to interfere in any country's political development.
Mexico's government-run daily El Nacional, in commenting on Cuba's
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national assembly elections, said the voting "represents an effort without
precedent. since a nation threatened by an imperialist power that seeks to
destroy its economic and social system cannot celebrate free elections, but
must restrict democracy for national security reasons.""
The U.S. stands to lose influence in Latin America as these countries
pull away from U.S. hegemony, developing alliances and policies which are
not in the U.S.' interest. If the United States cannot show good cause within
the context of a changed world order for its continued isolation of Cuba. it
risks not only its prestige as a world leader but also the opportunity to
avert chaos during the Cuban evolution towards democracy.
"
6 1Quoted in "Cuba's One-Party Election Getting Good Press in
Mexico," in the Miami Herald, 25 February 1993.
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IX. CONCLUSION
At this time, Cuban civil society is not strong enough to have a positive
impact on the course of a regime transition. Due to the lack of
associational groups, a coherent opposition movement, or any recognized
political alternative to the Castro regime, an abrupt overthrow of the regime
would result in political instability and social chaos. A sustainable
democracy requires a period of evolution marked less by adherence to
structural democracy, i.e. elections, than by a process of political opening
and liberalization. This allows time for democratic parties to develop
identities, leaderships, principles, and organizations, free from the
pressures of an election in which everything will be at stake. This
gradualism also gives the regime time to evolve into the new relationship.
learning to tolerate expanding participation and trust that concession will
not mean regime elimination.
Fidel Castro has been able to justify the repression of even the most
moderate opposition voices by claiming that they are the puppets of a
hostile superpower, bent on destroying the revolution that had brought
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economic and social parity to the Cuban people. With the passage of the
Cuban Democracy Act of 1992. Castro's assertion was further stengthened
by the perception that the United States was actively escalating hostilities
at a time when the Cuban "threat" had receded into irrelevance. Cuba's
dramatic economic decline is a result of the failure of the communist model
and the loss of Soviet trade: the U.S. embargo, however, provides Castro a
scapegoat with which he can goad Cuban nationalism and justify continued
sacrifice and repression in the name of anti-imperialism.
There can be no sustainable democracy in Cuba until there is a
sustained demand for democracy from within Cuban society. That demand
cannot be made until there is a blossoming of civil society, the growth of a
diverse multitude of associational groups free of regime control and
connected with each other and the larger world through a complex web of
relationships.
U.S. policy should therefore concentrate on promoting democracy from
the bottom up rather than imposing it from the top down. aiding in the
establishment of associational groups with a clear stake in a freer society.
In order to assist in the growth of civil society, the United States must
gradually end its embargo on Cuba and position itself economically and
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culturally for maximum influence on the development of a democratic, free-
market ideology. To achieve this the U.S. must work with the Castro
regime, providing rewards for liberalization without requiring immediate
political democratization. Castro's strength thus far has been the ability to
paint whatever picture of the United States that he chooses: contact with
American culture, products, business opportunities and citizens would
expose Cubans to new ideas and xpectations. and would provide the
impetus for a critical examination of the regime's performance by a society
grown too complex to be controlled by a totalitarian state.
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